:O

On 1998, 13th May, at 3:45 p.m, the ground shook in Pokhran, a desert in the northwestern state of Rajasthan. Soon after the event, the then prime minster of India, an upbeat Atal Behari Vajapayee, a maverick staunch nationalist and one of the finest, politics in India had ever seen, hurriedly assembled a conference and said these words.

Explosions in the desert 330 miles (530 km) southwest of New Delhi did not result in the release of radiation into the atmosphere. The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low-yield device and a thermo-nuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. I warmly congratulate the scientists and engineers who have carried out these successful tests.

This event stunned United States of America, then headed by Bill Clinton. Pakistan, which was under the regime of Nawaz Sharif, strongly condemned the tests and began a rhetorical diplomatic tirade. This period was one of the most tumultuous periods in history of India and Pakistan relations. The United states, fearing an arms race and backlash in region, tried to play the mediator part. They marked Time magazine’s principal correspondent on Soviet-American relations and an expert in foreign policy affairs, Strobe Talbott, for this purpose. Talbott has penned down his memoirs of this period in form of a racy book which departs from conventional books associated with diplomatic relations and the politics involved in a chilling, free flowing and substantive style.

In the book Talbott has interesting insider anecdotes, facts and reviews to mention a few – Bill Clinton’s fears of the subcontinent, his usual inside the office manners and off-the-fly remarks, quotes, relationship with the then Indian foreign minister Jaswanth Singh – which he termed as a friendly relationship, the bickering and vociferous aides of Nawaz Sharif, namely Sartaz Aziz, a politically correct and weak, helpless Nawaz Sharif – who merely played stuffs keeping in view his own party prospects in Pakistan, Musharaff’s misdeeds in Kargil and the army influence prevalent within Pakistan’s government, The BJP’s masterful handling of the period led with panache by A.B. Vajapayee and Jaswanth Singh, the foolish sanctions imposed by the Clinton regime, the politics involved in appeasing and pacifying two opposite sides by the United States and the relevant foreign policy decisions that resulted in aforementioned decisions and their effects and causes etc.

Talbott ends up praising Singh for most of the part, rolling out a favorable opinion about India and high regards for Jaswanth Singh. He clearly states it at the start itself.

As one of the architects of the Indian strategy, Jaswant Singh came closer to achieving his objective in the dialogue than I did to achieving mine. Insofar as what follows is that story, it stands as an exception to Dean Acheson’s maxim that the author of a memorandum of conversation never comes out second best.

The entire book is an awesome read, and I was left with a pleasant sense of amazement, that Talbott despite being an American who never lived in India, almost got most of his stuffs right. I strongly recommend reading this book to anyone who is interested in that period during 1998 and the usual politics, strategies and methods employed in Diplomatic circles during such crisises.